INTRODUCTION
The Regency Constitution of 1869 is considered by many to be the act that created the conditions for parliamentary democracy and confirmed our society’s openness to modern trends. At the same time, this constitution is particularly interesting not only from a legal and political perspective but also from a historical one, due to the circumstances that preceded its adoption, as well as those that followed it. While the constitutional text itself may not differ significantly from other 19th-century Serbian constitutions, the moment of its adoption makes it unique. Namely, the question arises as to what extent the timing and manner of the adoption of the Regency Constitution aligned with the national interests defined at the time. This question would certainly raise certain doubts, which, it seems, have been somewhat marginalized in our historical science. These doubts are precisely the subject of interest for the author, whose intention is to raise questions that, in the interest of the past, present and future of this nation, historians should fundamentally address. In the spirit of Bogišić’s remark that “the history of law must not be condemned to eternal impossibility of emerging from the suffocating pile of details and various contingencies,” the author will attempt, on the one hand, to simplify and, where possible, completely avoid facts that are not directly related to the subject of this work. On the other hand, the author will strive to present the context of certain circumstances. Although these circumstances may seem trivial when viewed in isolation, they represent pieces of a mosaic that, it seems, have not been fully recognized by historical science as a distinct narrative. This is the externally induced narrative of divisions, which was established as a constant in society from the time of the regency and has remained our greatest weakness and the main mechanism for external influences on the state and society to this day.
THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH THE ASSASSINATION WAS CARRIED OUT – COINCIDENCES OR PLANNED ACTS?
The assassination of Prince Mihailo on May 29, 1868, likely represents one of the greatest tragedies that struck the young Serbian state. Although it may not have directly caused subsequent events, it significantly influenced the course of future suffering. This event is rightly referred to by relevant authors as the Topčider catastrophe. Many circumstances surrounding the assassination remain shrouded in mystery, and there is little dispute about this. However, it seems that there is a lack of argumentation and even basic premises regarding the political background of the assassination.
The assassination was organized by the Belgrade lawyer Pavle Radovanović, a republican by political belief. The direct executors were his brothers Đorđe and Kosta Radovanović, former judge Lazar Marić, and merchant Stanoje Rogić. Although 17 people were shot in connection with their involvement in the conspiracy, it remains an open question who, besides these five, truly participated in the conspiracy and to what extent. It is still unclear whether anyone from the then state leadership was also part of the group that planned and carried out the assassination. The attempt to label Prince Aleksandar Karađorđević as the main organizer of the murder, along with the Nenadović family, is most likely a political spin that largely influenced the later course of Serbia’s internal and foreign policy. However, it should not be forgotten that some participants in the events identified liberals as the organizers[1], while others even saw some Russian involvement in the conspiracy, and there were even speculations about the involvement of the Ottoman Empire in the assassination. [2]The truth, however, is that Austria-Hungary profited the most, both from the Topčider catastrophe and from the later division of roles within the Serbian political scene.
The historical moment of the prince’s assassination is highly significant. Serbia, namely, was preparing for the non-violent annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, for which the prince had nearly completed the diplomatic groundwork. At that time, Russia had not yet been excluded from the sphere of influence in these territories, and with the prince’s assassination and the subsequent political events, Russia suffered a major diplomatic defeat.[3] In such a high-stakes great power game, it is hard not to assume that the Radovanović brothers were manipulated and used in the assassination. After the prince’s death, power was usurped through a classic military coup by Milovoj Petrović Blaznavac and Jovan Ristić, who later became regents through sheer coercion. The assassination itself bears many similarities to the assassination that occurred 135 years later in front of the Government building, in which the then Prime Minister of Serbia, Zoran Đinđić, was killed. In both cases, although the logistics for the murder were in place, the coup was actually attempted. In both cases, immediately after the murder, it was revealed that the police had prior operational knowledge of the participants in the assassination. [4]The historical moment is also quite similar, as it involved the disruption of both internal and foreign policy plans, as well as the profile of individuals who benefited professionally. In the end, there were mass arrests and an attempt to send a message of strength from those who had almost immediately identified the perpetrators.
After the assassination, many questions remained unanswered. For example, why did Đorđe Radovanović immediately head to the Austro-Hungarian embassy after the murder? [5]Is this related to the fact that one of the pistols used in the assassination, which clearly could not have been easily acquired, was popular among Austro-Hungarian senior officers? [6]Finally, even Kalaj [7]himself, in his diary, admits that there is a possibility that the assassination was organized in collaboration with Austro-Hungarian agents. Why did Blaznavac [8]take such a risk [9]just to ensure that Milan would take the throne? Was Blaznavac’s marriage to Katarina Konstantinović [10]a step toward fulfilling his ambition to seize the throne, especially when considering the fact that he himself claimed to be the illegitimate son of Prince Miloš?[11] Is his premature death connected to this? And to what extent are the stories true that Blaznavac tried to poison Prince Milan, and that, upon Katarina’s warning, Blaznavac was forced to drink the poisoned coffee himself? Or was his death caused by the realization that Blaznavac had fallen so much under Ristić’s (Russian) influence that he even accompanied Prince Milan on his first trip to Russia, sending a message to Vienna that he could no longer be counted on? What happened to the documents found with Blaznavac after his death, which were taken out of Serbia during the Austro-Hungarian occupation, and which King Milan personally claimed were so shocking and dangerous that they should never be revealed? What exactly did Milan Piroćanac mean [12]when, in 1896, he called for a historical revision of the trial concerning the murder of Prince Mihailo?[13] Finally, was Blaznavac a useful pawn in someone’s hands, orchestrating events such as the assassination of the prince, the radical change in foreign and domestic policy by the Regency, and especially the cover-up of the political background of the assassination and the adoption of the Regency Constitution, without having the ability to understand the consequences of his actions?
All of these questions are indeed significant, especially in light of the events that would follow. Slobodan Jovanović’s analysis [14]of Blaznavac’s role in the military coup that brought Milan to the throne[15], as well as Vienna’s attitude toward Prince Mihailo’s intention to peacefully take control of Bosnia, although brilliant, remains inconclusive. The reason for this may be the difficult position in which the author found himself, primarily due to the historical role of his father, who was one of the key actors in all these events. [14]Although, due to the passage of time and the massive destruction of archival material and written evidence—both by the authorities and the occupiers during the two wars—some questions cannot be fully clarified, other questions can be made indisputable. One of them is the acknowledgment of the prior existence of a plan by Blaznavac and Ristić to bring Milan to power after the prince’s assassination, a plan made before the members of the Trade Committee, as testified by Čedomilj Mijatović.[17] This bizarre event[18, which equally portrays the limits of Blaznavac and Mijatović’s self-assured vanity, leaves no doubt about Ristić and Blaznavac’s involvement in the Topčider catastrophe. [19]The only thing that is debatable is the degree of guilt and the role they played in it, but it is clear that in any modern society, such an acknowledgment should be considered a reasonable suspicion of the crime, though events in Serbia in the early 2000s did not suggest that it would lead to an adequate response from the prosecution.
Politically, the Regency, which de jure and de facto usurped power, managed to present itself to the liberals as the lesser evil compared to the conservatives, thereby securing their support. At the same time, it completely neutralized all those conservatives who could have played a significant role in shaping foreign policy.[20] In any case, the mystery of the assassination was further deepened by the unusually swift adoption of the Constitution of 1869.
SHOULD THE POSSIBILITY BE RULED OUT THAT PRINCE MIHAILO ACTUALLY LEFT A WILL?
Although Prince Mihailo himself intended to bring in and adopt a new constitutional text during his reign, this did not happen, among other reasons, due to the lack of support from the great powers [21]and his premature death. However, the Draft Constitution, which was prepared at the prince’s request [22]in early 1868 [23]and could not be prioritized [24]due to very intense diplomatic activities and grand plans for the expansion of Serbia that year[25], sheds light on the vision and directions for the future state organization. In this sense, the provisions fundamentally changed by the Regency Constitution, particularly those regarding the inheritance of the throne and the role of the Regency, are especially interesting. The provisions of the Draft suggest that the prince, who was certainly aware that he had no legitimate male heir, envisioned the possibility of appointing a successor through the adoption of another’s son. The National Assembly was given the authority to elect a prince in case of an inability to inherit. On the other hand, the Regency, which would temporarily govern in the event of the prince’s death without an heir, would be composed of the president of the State Council, the minister of justice, and the president of the Cassation Court, [26]with the goal of convening the National Assembly, which, together with the State Council, would elect a constitutional Regency with a three-year mandate. What is particularly interesting is that the Draft contains a provision stating that in the case of the prince’s minority, his closest relative over the age of 21 would become a member of the Regency. Analyzing these provisions, it seems that Prince Mihailo, at one point, had in mind a successor whom he would adopt when the time came. Furthermore, it is possible to assume that the prince also considered the possibility of abdicating in favor of a successor during his lifetime, ensuring his influence and control through membership in the Regency. The question that remains unresolved to this day is whom the prince had planned as his successor and, no less importantly, whether the prince himself was uncertain about the heir.
Here, a note should be added. According to the testimony of Ilija Đukanović, a state advisor and close friend and secretary of Petar I Karađorđević[27], King Petar personally stated that there was mutual respect between Prince Mihailo and Prince Aleksandar Karađorđević. He also mentioned that Prince Mihailo, in his letters to Prince Aleksandar, proposed reconciliation of the dynasties, even suggesting a marriage between Petar Karađorđević and Katarina Konstantinović to secure a place on the throne for their children. However, Princess Persida [28]thwarted this idea. These claims are corroborated by the defense of Prince Aleksandar during his trial in Pest, particularly by his defender, Aleksander Funtak. [29]According to contemporary accounts[30], in 1867, Prince Mihailo, in the presence of several individuals, announced that he had written a will and named Petar Karađorđević as his heir to the throne, leaving all his money to the state in preparation for war. This will was widely discussed in the press of the time, even during Prince Mihailo’s lifetime, which makes these testimonies possible, if not likely. It is difficult to assume that newspapers such as Novi Sad’s Zastava and Napredak or Vienna’s Debate[31], which implied the existence of the will, simply invented it, especially given that there was no reaction from the other side.[32]
The question of the potential existence of a will should also be considered within the constitutional framework. According to the Law on the Inheritance of the Throne from 1859, the right to inherit the throne belonged not to the Obrenović family but to Miloš’s heirs. This would mean that the potential heirs to the throne after the assassination of Prince Mihailo were, primarily, Mihailo’s illegitimate son Velimir Todorović, and then Milan Obrenović, but only if Milan had been previously adopted by Mihailo. Jovanović, in this context, sees the legal provisions as the reasons why, first, the Assembly and later Garašanin, insisted that the prince designate a successor during his lifetime. While Velimir was never mentioned as a potential heir, the great powers, particularly Austria-Hungary, insisted that Milan should inherit the throne. Petar Karađorđević was unacceptable, primarily to Andrašić[33], due to his closeness with Russia and the United Serbian Youth, while Milan, as a young and weak heir, was favored by Vienna.[34] It seems that the legal framework for the inheritance of the throne was not a relevant issue for Vienna, nor for Prince Mihailo, even if the existence of a will was not a key factor in determining the future prince. [35]Perhaps this is the main reason why there are so many different testimonies about the successor that Prince Mihailo had in mind[36], some of which are so obviously forced in their emphasis [37]that they seem more like an attempt to justify Milan’s accession to the throne. What seems most logical is that Prince Mihailo was counting on having descendants with Katarina Konstantinović, and that the draft of the new constitution was moving in that direction. However, it is also possible that, aware of the difficulties related to recognizing such a marriage [38]and completely captivated by the romantic relationship, he was also ready to abdicate the throne during his lifetime. In that case, choosing Petar Karađorđević as a successor would have been a very logical statesmanlike move, especially given the circumstances where the primary national interest was the expansion of Serbia to the west.
WHO WOULD HAVE BENEFITED FROM PRINCE MIHAILO NOT LEAVING A WILL?
After the death of the prince, the will was officially never found. This is the only claim that can be considered a fact. All other assumptions regarding the will may have a logical basis. The will could have been written and then destroyed immediately after the prince’s death by someone from his immediate circle, or it could have been written and destroyed by the prince himself. It is also possible that the will was never made. What is most likely among these possibilities is more a matter of perspective and certain preconceptions than the logical connection of facts. For this reason, for the sake of discussion, it makes sense to ask who would have been capable of taking such a risky and unscrupulous step as destroying an existing will, while also having an indisputable personal or other interest in doing so? The answer to this question seems to suggest itself: Milivoje Petrović Blaznavac.
Why Blaznavac? First and foremost, because he built his career on the same kind of risky, audacious, and immoral actions. During the Vučić rebellion, Blaznavac, who was then serving under Prince Jovan Obrenović, burned the order for the chiefs of the Čačak and Užice districts to assist Prince Mihailo. For this, he was punished by Prince Jovan with 50 lashes, but after Vučić’s victory, he benefited from this act—being transferred to Belgrade, which opened the doors to further advancement in his career[39]. An equally bold move was his involvement in the imprisonment of Prince Miloš in Zagreb, whose trust he gained in Vienna as his newspaper reader, only to later deceive him into going to Zagreb, where Miloš was arrested, and Blaznavac was paid for it. Slobodan Jovanović argued that without Blaznavac’s actions, Miloš’s release would not have occurred, and that had Blaznavac been in charge, “who knows what might have happened to him. “[40]Blaznavac was, therefore, a man who had already demonstrated that destroying a will would be a completely natural action for him, consistent with his character, in pursuing personal interests. The question remains: what interests would Blaznavac have protected if, by some chance, he had destroyed the will?
The answer here is logical. If, by some chance, Petar Karađorđević had been named as the heir to the throne in the will, what would have been Blaznavac’s fate? Would Prince Petar have allowed a former ardent defender of the Karađorđević dynasty and a former adjutant to his father to remain such an influential figure in the state? Would it have been acceptable for Prince Petar to allow someone who his father had tried to kill because he allegedly got too close to one of his sisters, to change sides and become a Karađorđević after being an Obrenović? Would Petar, or any other successor to the throne, have allowed Blaznavac’s involvement in the assassination of Prince Mihailo to remain uninvestigated? One thing is certain: Blaznavac owed his position to the influence of Anka Konstantinović over the prince, [41]and with Anka’s death, that connection was broken. Even if the assassination attempt had failed, it is hard to believe that Blaznavac would have remained in his position. Whether connected to the assassination or not, Blaznavac had no other choice but to ensure that the throne was taken over by someone under his control. Besides the fact that his interests aligned with those of Austro-Hungary, it is well-known that Blaznavac was a man who would have been willing to commit the most shameless betrayal of state and national interests for personal gain. The fact that in 1859, he sent a proposal to Osman-Pasha in the Belgrade Fortress to expel the Obrenović family and allow the Turks to reoccupy Serbia is a known fact. It is also known that Prince Mihailo was aware of this and had long refused Garašanin’s proposal for Blaznavac to become a minister because of it.[42] It seems that Blaznavac’s biography and personal profile alone were a guarantee that, without a doubt, Blaznavac would have destroyed the will, had he been in a position to do so. Whether this actually happened, history will likely never confirm.
ABOUT THE CONSTITUTION
It is almost widely known in legal circles that the Regency Constitution introduced parliamentary practices to Serbia, if not parliamentarism itself, then at least the foundation for its establishment, primarily through the new role and powers of the National Assembly. It reflects the shared interests of the liberal intelligentsia and the ambitions of the Regency. While it is undoubtedly aligned with social progress, the question remains whether it truly defines the national interest.[43].
The Constitution was not only enacted at an inopportune time, but its adoption also prevented the unification of Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina into a single vassal state under the protection of Turkey and, consequently, England. By itself, even if it had introduced a perfect system, the Constitution at that moment was a step in the wrong direction, placing Serbia de facto in a position where, in foreign policy, it had to choose between the interests of Austria-Hungary on one side and the interests of all other great powers on the other. It narrowed Turkey’s maneuvering space in relation to Serbia and lead to a direct confrontation with no possibility of an agreement that would be in both parties’ interests. At the same time, it placed Russia in a highly unfavorable position in relation to Serbia’s interests. It completely neutralized all of Prince Mihailo’s diplomatic efforts regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina. It can be argued that the regents, whether intentionally or not, effectively eliminated all of Serbia’s opportunities within the broader geopolitical calculations of the great powers at the time. that existed in the calculation of the great powers’ interests at the time.
Moreover, such a constitution at the time had no legitimacy, since neither the prince nor the people participated in its creation. The Nikoljski Committee that prepared the constitutional text represented a forum of interest groups, and the constitution was created by the Regency, which, in this way, completely usurped sovereignty. Considering that Blaznavac fully controlled the National Assembly and dictated its decisions, [44]it is clear that this constitution, in terms of legitimacy and legality, was even more regressive than the Turkish Constitution, which, although imposed, was at least accepted by the sovereign through his free will.
Another, perhaps more important, reason why this constitution cannot be considered legitimate is the agreement between Blaznavac and Vienna, concluded at the latest during the formation of the Regency, with the mediation of Kalaj[45], although there are indications that it occurred earlier. [46]Blaznavac promised to exclude Russian influence and to rely on Austria-Hungary. It was expected that, immediately after the Nikoljski Committee, Andrašiji would send congratulations to the Regency for the reforms they intended to implement. Kalaj evaluated this reform as a useful focus on internal matters rather than foreign policy. [47]Of course, this provoked a negative reaction from Russia, but without any substantial effect. This indicates that the essential reason for adopting the constitution was primarily a political message to the great power, which, following the Topčider catastrophe, had essentially taken the initiative in Serbia. This, in turn, was nothing more than, albeit temporary, an oath of loyalty from the most influential political figure at that moment, Milivoje Blaznavac.
Furthermore, the Regency Constitution was adopted in violation of the Law on the National Assembly, which prohibited the adoption of a constitution when the prince was a minor. Therefore, it was not adopted in accordance with the law in a formal-legal sense. Although it is often mentioned that pragmatic reasons, such as protecting the interests of the Obrenović dynasty and the protection of Serbia, were behind the adoption of the constitution—since Turkey intended to appoint its representative as the supreme ruler of Serbia, to prevent a new coup by the supporters of the Karađorđević dynasty, etc.—[48]this view is subject to numerous criticisms. Given the circumstances of the time, and especially the behavior of Blaznavac and Ristić, it is hard to believe that either of them thought beyond their personal interests, which were primarily focused on creating the belief in the public that Alexander Karađorđević was behind the assassination of the prince. All the details from the trial of the prince’s assassins, including the refusal to deliver the files to the court in Pest, as well as the transfer of the files to the Palace with the explanation that the files had burned, etc., are circumstances [49]that confirm the assumption that the regency had much to hide from the public. Preventing Turkey’s involvement through constitutional changes, which included modifying the Turkish constitution, is so unconvincing that it does not even deserve further discussion. The same can be said for the argument that the constitution was intended to prevent a coup, as, at least to the author of this text, no similar event is known from practice. This is even more so because a coup had already been carried out, and it was executed by Blaznavac. It is more likely that, for Blaznavac, the constitution was nothing more than a step toward his goal: taking the princely title, with Ristić finding a basis for positioning himself and, secondarily, the implementation of certain bureaucratic-liberal values that Blaznavac certainly was not interested in. Therefore, the adoption of the constitution was more of a compromise between the two of them than a compromise between political factors. The fact that Blaznavac and Ristić, through skillful political maneuvering, gained the support of the liberals and even some conservatives, although important for the legitimacy of the usurped Regency, does not have a direct connection with the acceptance of the imposed constitution. Starting with the Assembly’s meeting in Kragujevac, where the prince and Regency’s [50]election was confirmed under pressure, all the way to the formation and completion of the Nikoljski Committee’s work, the pattern was the same— all government bodies simply did what was required of them.
In support of the previous remarks, the fact that the Regency Constitution introduced political spin and the demonization of political opponents, with the loss of voting rights, is worth noting. Specifically, Article 10 of the Constitution prescribed a ban on the Karađorđević family and their descendants from being elected as prince, as they were “cursed by the people.” It is clear that this provision was a result of Blaznavac and Ristić’s attempt to blame Alexander Karađorđević for the assassination and, in this way, direct the political narrative in a certain direction. After all, it was simply part of the political arsenal used to influence public opinion at the time. The problem, however, is that the pattern of divisions, formally established by this constitution, not only became established but also entrenched in a state that, even before formally gaining independence from Turkey, was already largely controlled by Austria-Hungary. An even greater problem is that this pattern, in its application in the future, led to unforeseen disasters for the state and the Serbian people.
The special role of the military in the Constitution would also align with the previous assumptions. It seems that the provisions regarding the military [51] in the Regency Constitution are much stronger than those in the 1888 Constitution, and they immediately reflect the vision that Blaznavac had for the military. [52] The provision in Article 35 of the Constitution, stating that the military cannot be reduced, as well as the provision in Article 36, which states that the military cannot be negotiated and can only be gathered by order of the commanders, clearly reflect not only the intentions of the framers of the constitution but also their behavior at the time when the Regency took power. It should not be forgotten that it was precisely through his orders to the military, immediately after the assassination of the prince, that Blaznavac first took the initiative and then played a key role in the act of violently seizing power. It can be said that the Regency drew its power from the agreement between Blaznavac and Hristić, i.e., from complete control over the military and the police. The purpose of the military’s role in this framework was to preserve this valuable resource under the conditions and in the manner that had already served its purpose once.
Interestingly, the Constitution, along with the provision regarding the curse on the Karađorđević family, also included a provision stating that legal representatives (lawyers) could not be elected as deputies unless they were the prince’s choice. [53]This provision was a result of pure populism, in which the generally unpopular legal profession was essentially punished to appease the members of the Assembly, who, in turn, provided the necessary legitimacy to the Regency’s illegal actions. This is one of the rare provisions [54]that were adopted by the Assembly itself and were not an integral part of the constitutional proposal.
In line with this subsequent legitimacy, Article 56 of the Constitution grants the prince the authority to issue orders with legal force in the event that “the security of the land, either from the outside or from within, is in great danger,” with these orders later being submitted to the National Assembly for approval. Although this provision essentially resembles a state of emergency, and despite the fact that in more recent Serbian history we have seen how acts that are not laws can be legalized[55], this is not the case here. It seems that this formulation more likely opens up possibilities for the Ministerial Council to propose certain acts that will temporarily replace laws to protect “national security,” but not the tax rates. The regency’s calculation that such a possibility would be necessary in the near future cannot be ruled out as a rationale for this constitutional provision. For this to be broadly accepted, the Assembly had to retain absolute authority in determining taxes.
In essence, the other provisions, as well as the entire constitutional concept, represent Ristić’s vision of politics, codified within the family circle. [56]This is not even the policy of the liberals, but rather the policy of the bureaucracy, with an artificially attached National Assembly, as Svetozar Marković aptly points out in his critique. [57]The Constitution gives ministers complete control over the work of the Assembly, and the system laws confirm this. [58]The Assembly, from which bureaucrats and lawyers are excluded, except for every third delegate appointed by the prince from the ranks of the intelligentsia, is nothing more than a mechanism through which the Regency pursues its interests. The seemingly granted freedoms are so limited that, in practice, they were almost nonexistent. Serbia adopted a bureaucratic system that favored the great powers and the personal ambitions of average statesmen. This was more Ristić’s vision of preserving his own position at the top of the state than a vision for the future of Serbia. If that had been the goal, the Constitution would never have been adopted.
However, there are authors, such as Petrović, who believe that the Regency Constitution was “an attempt to express fragments of the national spirit through certain principles of contemporary European constitutionalism,” insisting on its reformist quality and, in particular, “laying the foundation for modern representative democracy.” If modern representative democracy is defined as the coercion of military force over a constitutional assembly, the violation of laws during the adoption of the constitution, the protection of personal interests, and, finally, the loss of the country’s geopolitical position from which national interests could be safeguarded, then there is no reason not to agree with these authors. Interestingly, no parallel is drawn with the working draft of the constitution that was prepared by the same Radivoje Milojković, but on the orders of Prince Mihailo, which was not adopted solely because the new constitution was fairly low on the list of state priorities. On the other hand, excessive importance is given to secondary characteristics (original, modern in expression, etc.), while completely ignoring the fact that almost no significant “modern” institution actually became functional in practice. Without intending to diminish the significance of these considerations in any way, we must note that behind every constitution lies statehood. Essentially, there was a choice between a larger state with an autocratic constitution that could be applied and changed when the time came, and a smaller state that adopted modern institutions, which, however, were never implemented. The Regency opted for the latter, although they could not have known the unforeseen tragedies that would befall the people, primarily in Bosnia and Herzegovina but also beyond, as a result of Prince Mihailo’s politics being interrupted by a constitutional charade. Contemporary figures, unlike the regents, should have kept this in mind.
CONCLUDING STATEMENTS
Considering the circumstances under which it was adopted, the Regency Constitution can be seen as a political move by Blaznavac and Ristić, through which they solidified their usurped power and simultaneously created an opportunity for a major diplomatic victory for Austria-Hungary over Russia. After this, Russia could never again play the role it had previously held in the Balkans, and Turkey’s foreign policy space was also restricted. It is difficult to say exactly what role these two ministers played in the assassination of the prince, but there are serious indications that, after the assassination, they succeeded in changing the political course in Serbia—not only regarding the successor to the throne and the current foreign policy but also in terms of creating a foundation for further Austrian influence. This culminated in a new generation of self-sufficient politicians, for whom the state and national interest were overshadowed by their own egos, with the highest ideal being approval from imperial courts. In this way, the groundwork was laid for the signing of the Secret Convention of 1881. The assassination, the regency rule, and ultimately the adoption of the constitution at the wrong time are the causes of all the later tragedies, starting with the May Coup, through the consequences of two world wars, and up to the dismemberment of a people and the creation of new, mutually conflicting nations. The personal ambition of individuals who were unable to recognize and use the historical moment in favor of the state and the people sowed the seed of hatred, upon which the politics of division was later built and continues to be carried out today. The constitution merely served this purpose as a means, not an end. Serbia became disoriented and has never recovered from that state. These events are a clear illustration of the truth that the absolutist rule of a capable statesman dedicated to the interests of the state and people often represents a better model of governance than that of average careerists, who defend the state and people from complex geopolitical circumstances and promises made to the great powers that brought them to power—all under the banner of democracy and modern social achievements.
Vojin Biljić
[1] Nikola Hristić believed that the organizers were Stevča Mihajlović and Mitropolit Mihailo.
[2]Like Ristić, but in his later work.
[3]The translation of the provided text is:”Car Aleksandar II wrote the following regarding the assassination: ‘The hardest times we are going through now are in the East. It requires a great deal of skill, caution, and luck to get through the current critical era.’ In this sense, D. Leovac, Serbia and Russia during the Second Reign of Prince Mihailo (1860-1868), Belgrade, 2015, p. 291.”
[4] In that sense N. Hristić, Memoirs.
[5] I. Đukanović, The Killing of Prince Mihailo, Events that were forbiden to be talked about.
[6] D.Leovac
[7] Venjamin fon Kalaj, in that time Austro-Hungary deputy (ambassador) in Belgrade
[8] Milivoje Petrović Blaznavac, Minister of the Military and a Leading Figure of the Regency
[9] It is a fact that Blaznevac essentially carried out a military coup and the army ensured Milan would take the throne; for more details, see S.Jovanović, The Second Government of Miloš and Mihailo, Belgrade, 1933.
[10] The daughter of Anka Kostantinović, an influential relative of Prince Mihailo, whom the prince was in love witch she survived the assassination attempt and, only three months later, married Blaznevac.
[11] The mother of Milivoje Blaznevac served in Miloš’s harem.
[12] The president of the Progressive government and long’time opponent of Jovan Ristić
[13] This letter was sent by Piroćanac to Stojan Novaković, who officially forwarded it on January 20, 1896, to the Minister of the Interior, Dimitrije Marinković.
[14] The Second Government of Miloš and Mihailo, Belgrade, 1933
[15] Especially the part of the analysis concerning the recruitment of Nikola Hristić in his attempt to strengthen his position.
[16] Vladimir Jovanović, the father of Slobodan Jovanović, was even accused of participating in organizing the assassination, but was acquitted of the charges. In the documentation of the organizer Pavle Radovanović, he was planned to be the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the goverment that would be formed after the assassination of the prince. Later, he became one of the leaders of the Progressives, whose rule was marked by an Austrophilic policy, and the major events in which the Progressives participated, such as the Secret Convention, changes in education, confrontations with the church, etc., had very negative consequences for the state and the people.
[17] One of the most significant figures of the Progressive regime and a key figure in the events that would define relations in the next century.
[18] Č. Mijatović, Memoirs of a Balkan Diplomat, Belgrade, 2017.
[19] Mijatović describes the meeting between Blaznavac and Ristić with the merchants, where, in a relaxed conversation, Blaznavac stated that upon hearing rumors that Prince Mihailo would be assassinated, he thought about the next steps and decided that Milan should immediately take power, and that Ristić supported this idea of his; it should be noted that this is certainly a softened version of the events, as it essentially represents Mijatović’s distancing from the position of the Trade Committee, whose members were horrified by these statements and, as a result, left the meeting. After the meeting, Mijatović, in his capacity as secretary, drafted a report in which he distanced himself from the Trade Committee and publicly stated that the committee members had misunderstood the regents, for which he was rewarded with a prompt promotion and advancement in his diplomatic career. At the time of this event, Mijatović was 27 years old.
[20] By removing the Garašani, recruiting Hristić, etc.
[21] According to the testimony of Nikola Hristić, the most loyal and probably the most reliable official of the time, Gorčakov advised the prince not to change the Turkish constitution due to the Porte, but to alter the state system through laws, which the prince accepted; in this regard, Nikola Hristić, Memoirs 1840-1862, Belgrade, 2006, p. 359.
[22] The draft of the text was prepared by Radivoje Milojković, the president of the Appellate Court, later the Minister of the Interior.
[23] J. Prodanović, Constitutional development and constitutional Struggles in Serbia, Belgrade 1936, pp.151-161
[24] It refers to Prince Mihailo preparatory actions for the takeover of Bosnia and Hercegovina
[25] According to Nikola Hrisitć’s words: “… this constitutional issue had to be postponed so that we could present and introduce it only in liberated and enlarged Serbia, if fortune would favor us…”
[26] J. Nicović, Constitutional Development of Serbia 1804-2006, Belgrade, 2007, p. 105.
[27] I. Đukanović, The Assassination of Prince Mihailo and Events That Could Not Be Spoken About, Belgrade, 1935.
[28] The wife of Prince Aleksandar, granddaughter of Jakov Nenadović and Mladen Milovanović.
[29] Zastava Newspaper No. 19, dated February 12, 1869.
[30] District Chief Dević, quoted by Đukanović.
[31] Đukanovic, cit.
[32] A serious public debate was held regarding the authenticity of these events between Ilija Đukanović and Slobodan Jovanović, and although it was largely personal and concerned the role of Vladimir Jovanović, the father of Slobodan Jovanović, it seems that Đukanović’s argumentation was more convincing.
[33] Count Julius (Đula) Andraši, Prime Minister of Hungary and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Monarchy, and also the patron of the then ambassador to Serbia, Venjamin fon Kalaj
[34] In this sense, S. Rajić, Serbia’s Foreign Policy, Between Reality and expectations, Belgrade, 2015, p.68
[35] By law, the will played a decisive role in the selection of the heir.
[36] From Petar Karađorđević, through Milan Obrenović, to the Montenegrin Prince Nikola Petrović, cited bz Raji; we should not completely exclude the possibility that Velimir’s conversion to orthodoxy, born as Wilhem, was precisely to create the opportunity for him to become, at one point, the legitimate son and thus the heir to the throne.
[37] Such as the testimony of Nikola Hristić, in the Memoir appendix
[38] Due to family ties with Katarina
[39] Slobodan Jovanović, The Government of Milan Obrenović, p.2
[40] As previous
[41] Blaznavac, unlike Garašanin, supported the marriage of Prince Mihailo and Katarina Konstantinović.
[42] Slobodan Jovanović, The Government of Milan Obrenović, pp.10
[43] For at least two reasons, we will disregard the fact that the very adoption of a Constitution, which was not a gift from the Sultan, represents a step forward in consolidating Serbia’s independence. The first is that an independent constitution would have certainly been adopted, and it was unrealistic to expect that any constitution-maker would consult the Porte to draft a new Hatt-i-Şerif, especially not in a situation where it was in the interest of the great powers to ensure Serbia’s constitutional consolidation within its existing borders rather than within borders it might potentially have. The second reason lies in the open question of whether the Constitution was adopted at the wrong time and whether it would have been politically wiser to play the card of unification with Bosnia, since Turkey accepted the possibility of such unification, provided that both territories remained in a vassal status.
[44] In further detail: S. Jovanović, The Second Government of Miloš and Mihailo
[45]As previous
[46] In that case, there would be direct involvement of Blaznavac in the assassination, and the perspective of this event would have a completely foreign-policy character.
[47] S. Jovanović, Goverment of Milan Obrenović, Belgrade, 1934
[48] M. Radojević, Institute for Political Studies, Political Review, An Essay on the Development of Serbian Constitutionalism – The Regency Constitution, Belgrade, 2010, p. 466.
[49] In further detail: I. Đukanović
[50] At the time the Assembly was being held, around 1,600 armed soldiers were stationed nearby, sending a clear message about what decision had to be made.
[51] Articles 35-37
[52] In more detailed S. Jovanović, The Second Government of Miloš and Mihail
[53] Article 48
[54] Along with the provision of Article 53, through which the Assembly ensured that the Prince, upon the proposal of the Assembly itself, appoints the president and vice president, instead of the Government, which was the initial proposal.
[55] It refers to the laws through which the National Assembly, after the end of the state of emergency in the summer of 2020, granted the government the authority to issue acts in the area of law, with the force of law.
[56] Radivoje Milojković, who was Ristić’s brother-in-law and the son-in-law of the famous Hadži Toma, played a significant role in drafting the constitutional text. Later, in his role as the Minister of Police, he showed what it looks like when a person violates the very norms they personally wrote.
[57] D.Jevtić, D. Popović, Legal history of the Yugoslav people, Belgrade, 1994
[58] Election Law, Press Law and etc.